The Tank

https://www.mei.edu/publications/taliba ... nrepentant


The Taliban: Unrecognized and unrepentant
April 1, 2022
Richard Weitz

Despite expectations that China, Russia, and other states would try to exploit the Western military departure from Afghanistan, the Taliban’s regime remains unrecognized by any other government. Neighboring countries have not gone beyond limited diplomatic engagement, economic detachment, and security containment. Though the Taliban have focused on consolidating their internal authority rather than sponsoring foreign terrorist groups, U.N. experts have warned that Afghanistan has become a more favorable environment for such movements as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and especially the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Furthermore, the Taliban’s recently renewed culture war against women and other Afghans will likely make international engagement with the group even more difficult.

China as first mover

On March 25, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an unexpected visit to Afghanistan on his South Asian tour, which included stops in India and Pakistan. He was arguably the most important foreign visitor to Kabul since the Taliban seized power last August. As in previous Sino-Taliban meetings, the Chinese delegation made clear that they want the Taliban to protect Chinese interests, nationals, and investments in neighboring countries as well as Afghanistan. Chinese representatives have dangled before the Taliban the potential for recognition of their government along with aid for national reconstruction in return for the Taliban’s abstaining from supporting regional terrorism and allowing Chinese businesses to profit from Afghanistan’s natural resources. China has kept its embassy in Kabul operating to sustain close communication with the group’s leaders. Beijing also invited the Taliban to send a representative to the Third Foreign Ministers' Meeting Among the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan, held in the city of Tunxi on March 31, the first time a Taliban official has attended this gathering of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Despite Wang’s recent visit, China has approached Afghanistan gingerly. Chinese business entities continue to hold off on expanding existing investments or making new ones. China’s major economic projects, such as those involving the Mes Aynak copper mine and the Amu Darya oil and gas reserves, remain mothballed for various economic, ecological, and regulatory reasons. Although China shares a narrow border with Afghanistan along the Wakhan Corridor connecting northeast Afghanistan to western Xinjiang, the authorities in Beijing have made this conduit largely impenetrable to transit by people or goods. China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects also circumvent Afghan territory. In the security realm, Chinese policymakers are most immediately concerned with how the Taliban victory might increase instability in other countries neighboring both China and Afghanistan, such as Pakistan or the Central Asian republics. There are many more Chinese nationals and investments in these states than in Afghanistan itself. The recent attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan have heightened Chinese sensitivities around terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals there.

Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia seek security with commerce

Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban have deteriorated now that the group has returned to power in Kabul. Taliban leaders have taken the same firm line as previous Afghan governments against Pakistani efforts to build fences along the so-called Durand Line, which Islamabad sees as the formal Afghan-Pakistan border. Videos show Taliban fighters smashing the demarcation fences erected by Pakistan. Afghans insist that the 2,600-km frontier should be open for cross-border movement by the Pashtun tribes located on both sides of the frontier. Besides legitimizing their territorial claims, Pakistani authorities want to erect barriers against infiltration by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (aka the “Pakistani Taliban” or TTP) militants who use sanctuaries in Afghanistan to support terrorist operations in Pakistan. Taliban actions may reflect irritation at Islamabad’s failure to recognize the Taliban government, despite doing so in the 1990s, as well as initiatives by local border commanders. Yet, the Pakistan government is reluctant to make a clean break with the Taliban. The connections with the group give Islamabad leverage with China, which expects Pakistan to advance Chinese interests in Afghanistan. A breakdown in ties could also give India an opening to rebuild its presence in the country.

In contrast, the Taliban’s ties with Iran have improved more than anticipated. There has been no reprise of the 1998 border clash between the two countries, when they almost went to war. In recent years, Iranian representatives have reached out to various Taliban factions, hedging against the group’s return to power. The new leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Quds Force, Gen. Esmail Qaani, has played a leading operational role in Iranian security operations regarding Afghanistan. These have ranged from countering narcotics trafficking along the 900-km Afghan-Iranian frontier to recruiting Afghans for a proxy paramilitary unit, the Liwa Fatemiyoun. Having gained extensive experience fighting on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria, this unit could be deployed to support Quds Force operations in Afghanistan. Whatever lingering animosity might exist between the Iranian and Afghan regimes, both oppose the ISKP, which has attacked Afghanistan’s Shi’a Hazara minority. Additionally, a stable Afghanistan, even if run by the Taliban, could reduce the millions of refugees in Iran. Stability could also offer opportunities for transborder trade that circumvents U.S. sanctions. When Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited Tehran on Jan. 8, the parties discussed “political, economic, transit, and refugee issues,” along with water rights. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Saeed Khatibzadeh called the talks, which included Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, a “positive” step, though the Iranian government insists that the Taliban-led government become more “inclusive” to earn its official recognition.


Central Asian governments are struggling to manage the novel security environment. Some have relaxed their border and customs controls with Afghanistan for some economic activities, but they more strictly regulate the movement of refugees and asylum seekers. Relations between the Taliban and the Tajikistani government remain particularly poor. President Emomali Rahmon has accused the Pashtun-led Taliban of discriminating against Afghanistan’s ethnic Tajiks. Taliban leaders have denounced Rahmon and threatened retaliation against his government and neighboring Uzbekistan for failing to return the Afghan military planes and helicopters flown out of Afghanistan by air force pilots fleeing the country. Meanwhile, there has been crossfire between Taliban and Turkmenistan border guards. Even so, these three Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan, along with Kazakhstan, continue to send food, electricity, and other goods to Afghanistan, and have not openly supported an anti-Taliban insurgency as they did when backing the Northern Alliance in the 1990s.

Moscow’s Afghan options

Russian policymakers have been hedging against a possible Taliban victory for years by developing a working relationship with a group that Moscow officially deems a terrorist organization. In addition to cultivating contacts with the group, in recent years Russian representatives shared intelligence and provided the Taliban with arms and money. Even so, Russian officials seemed as astonished as others by the swift and sweeping Taliban triumph in August 2021. Russia would have preferred a military stalemate and a negotiated settlement that would have enhanced Moscow’s leverage by empowering some Afghan notables with whom Russia has cultivated close ties, such as former Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Still, President Vladimir Putin and his ministers enjoyed characterizing the outcome as a humiliation for NATO and the United States. Russian commentators warned Ukrainians that the West would abandon them just as easily, so they should reach a deal with Moscow while they could. They pressed Central Asian governments not to allow the Pentagon to relocate to bases on their territory, even to conduct “over-the-horizon” strikes against the terrorists in Afghanistan, whom Russian leaders cited as a major threat to Central Asia and the Russian Federation itself. Moreover, Russian officials cautioned these governments to deny Western requests to repatriate refugees through their territories on the pretext that the terrorists might exploit such an effort.

Russia kept its embassy in Kabul open and expanded engagements with Taliban representatives to encourage them to pursue moderate policies at home and abroad. Though Taliban leaders have fulfilled their pledge not to support international terrorism, their triumph could easily inspire Muslim militants to seize power in other Eurasian nations. Russian analysts have also questioned whether the group has the capacity to prevent other Eurasian terrorist groups from operating from within its borders. The instability seen during the past year in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, along with the abrupt outbreak of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, probably made Moscow uneasy about the looseness of its regional allies’ grip on power in the face of the Taliban triumph. When sending several thousand Russian soldiers to Kazakhstan in January, Russian officials accepted the Kazak government’s line that the violent January 2022 riots in that country were caused by foreign extremists. Yet Russians hope to profit economically from any Afghan economic recovery. Though Russians have fewer investment resources than China, they often are more daring in their pursuit of foreign riches in fragile nations, such as in Africa, than Western or even Chinese entrepreneurs. Russia would also like to participate in any new economic conduits linking Afghanistan to Central and South Asia. Moscow has strived to advance its regional objectives by hosting senior officials from China, India, Iran, and Pakistan to discuss Afghan-related topics.

Taliban troubles

Since the Taliban has consolidated its power domestically, its neighbors have focused on making it behave as a responsible actor externally. As negative encouragement, they have not recognized the Taliban government or removed the group from terrorist lists, making clear that international legitimacy required better behavior. Neighboring states urge the Taliban to take measures to become a more acceptable partner to all foreign countries, since they want other states to bear the main burden of Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction. In this regard, Chinese and Russian representatives have blamed the United States and its allies for Afghanistan’s troubles. Both Beijing and Moscow have called for releasing frozen funds and providing additional foreign assistance to Afghans.

The Taliban have ignored ISKP condemnation of their ties with China, Iran, and Russia, which the ISKP have castigated as “the biggest enemies of Islam.” But the Taliban, without warning, have recently dismayed their neighbors by engaging in a fresh round of repressive acts that recalled their policies of the 1990s. For example, the Taliban’s Ministry of Vice and Virtue has deployed inspectors to public buildings to check whether entrants have proper beards, attire, and other signs of outward conformity to the Taliban’s distinct interpretation of Islamic dress requirements. The authorities have also imposed new limits on women travelers and established separate days for Kabul’s men and women to visit the city’s parks. Their last-minute reversal of a decision to allow girls to attend secondary school and a new edict banning foreign media content from local broadcasters provoked formal protests from the United States and other Western governments, pushing back the possibility of the Taliban government one day receiving broad international recognition.

https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSym ... sted=False
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UND ... penElement

(22 pages)

Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and
2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings
and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to transmit herewith the twenty-ninth report of the Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and
2253 (2015), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities, in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution
2610 (2021).
I should be grateful if the attached report could be brought to the attention of
the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Trine Heimerback
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and
associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

https://news.yahoo.com/chinas-foreign-m ... 11593.html

China's foreign minister makes surprise stop in Afghanistan

KATHY GANNON
March 24, 2022

KATHY GANNON
March 24, 2022·5 min read
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — China’s foreign minister made a surprise visit Thursday in Afghanistan's capital, meeting with the country's new Taliban rulers — even as the international community fumes over the former insurgents’ broken promise to reopen schools to girls beyond the sixth grade.

According to the official Bakhtar News Agency, Wang Yi was to meet with Taliban leaders “to discuss various issues, including the extension of political relations, economic, and transit cooperation.”

The Taliban, who seized power last August during the chaotic final weeks of the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces after 20 years of war, have been seeking international recognition in order to open up Afghanistan's economy, which has been in free fall since their takeover.

Wang’s visit came as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, was also in Kabul. Kabulov also met with the Taliban-appointed foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, Taliban spokesman Qahar Balkhi said.

“The meeting focused on strengthening political, economic, transit and regional relations,” Balkhi tweeted.

Both Beijing and Moscow have become significant regional players, outdistancing the United States. Russia and China, which have both criticized the hasty U.S. departure from Afghanistan, worry that their enemies could find a safe haven under the Taliban rule.

Though neither has shown any inclination to officially recognize the Taliban government, both Moscow and Beijing have avoided criticizing the new rulers despite their repressive rules directed particularly at women, who are denied the right to work and full access to education.

On Wednesday, the Taliban unexpectedly reversed plans to reopen schools in Afghanistan to girls above the sixth grade, reneging on their promise in a move apparently meant to appease their hard-line base at the expense of further alienating the international community.

The U.S.-led coalition unseated the Taliban in 2001 after they refused to hand over al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America. The Taliban returned to power in mid-August and installed an all-male, Taliban-only administration. The international community has been urging them to open up the government to ethnic minorities and women.

Wang is one of the highest-level visitors to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover. China has economic and mining interests in Afghanistan and Afghans familiar with past talks between the Taliban and Chinese officials say Beijing wants Taliban commitments to prevent China's Uyghur opponents from setting up operations in Afghanistan.

China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin would not comment on Wang’s visit to Kabul, only saying that China was “stepping up preparations for the third meeting of foreign ministers of Afghanistan’s neighbors."

China stands ready to “continue to contribute our strengths and advantages as a neighbor to the long-term stability of Afghanistan,” Wang told reporters at a daily briefing.

The issue of girls' education wasn't mentioned by Wang or in reports on the minister's visit issued by the Foreign Ministry and official Xinhua News Agency.

“We expect the Afghan side to continue to build inclusive and prudent governance, better safeguard the rights and interests of women and children, and demonstrate the tolerance and friendliness of Muslims," Wang was quoted as saying by the ministry.

China, which routinely opposes unilateral sanctions such as those imposed on the Taliban by the U.S. and others, is “willing to carry out mutually beneficial cooperation with Afghanistan in an orderly manner, under the premise of respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty," Wang said.

Xinhua quoted him saying that China “opposes forces outside the region to wantonly mount political pressure or impose economic sanctions on Afghanistan, and hopes the Afghan caretaker government will establish an inclusive political structure, implement prudent policies, and make active efforts to serve the interests of the Afghan people and meet the expectation of the international community, Wang said.

Last July, Wang hosted a senior Taliban delegation with their top leader, Abdul Ghani Baradar, in the Chinese city of Tianjin. At that meeting, Wang sought assurances the Taliban would not allow anti-China groups to operate under their rule and referred to the Taliban as “a pivotal military and political force in Afghanistan.”

There have been reports that militants from among the Turkic Muslim Uyghur minority native to China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang have found shelter in Afghanistan. China has carried out a campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, including locking a million or more away in political re-education camps.

The overseas East Turkistan Islamic Movement has for years fought a low-level insurgency against Chinese rule. It has been aligned with the Islamic State group's affiliate in Afghanistan — known as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province — an enemy of the Taliban.

Despite consistent and documented reports of Beijing's crackdown on Uyghurs, Wang was welcomed as a special guest in Pakistan earlier this week, at a summit of foreign ministers from the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

At the summit, Wang called for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. None of the OIC participants or host Pakistan, which has been particularly vocal about growing Islamophobia, mentioned China's crackdown on its minority Muslims, including the destruction of mosques and punishment for those Uyghurs who participate in religious edicts.

China also has an interest in a stable Afghanistan as it has been used as a base for insurgent attacks against Chinese nationals in neighboring Pakistan. It also has a multi-billion dollar road project in Pakistan linking the Arabian Sea Port of Gwadar with China in the northwest.

https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan- ... 6e284d7f52

Taliban break promise on higher education for Afghan girls
By KATHY GANNON
March 24, 2022

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers unexpectedly decided against reopening schools Wednesday to girls above the sixth grade, reneging on a promise and opting to appease their hard-line base at the expense of further alienating the international community.

The surprising decision, confirmed by a Taliban official, is bound to disrupt efforts by the Taliban to win recognition from potential international donors at a time when the country is mired in a worsening humanitarian crisis. The international community has urged Taliban leaders to reopen schools and give women their right to public space.

The reversal was so sudden that the Education Ministry was caught off guard on Wednesday, the start of the school year, as were schools in parts of the Afghan capital of Kabul and elsewhere in the country. Some girls in higher grades returned to schools, only to be told to go home.

Aid organizations said the move exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding Afghanistan’s future as the Taliban leadership seems to struggle to get on the same page as it shifts from fighting to governing.

It also came as the leadership was convening in Kandahar amid reports of a possible Cabinet shuffle.

U.S. Special Representative Thomas West tweeted his “shock and deep disappointment” about the decision, calling it “a betrayal of public commitments to the Afghan people and the international community.”

He said the Taliban had made it clear that all Afghans have a right to education, adding, “For the sake of the country’s future and its relations with the international community, I would urge the Taliban to live up to their commitments to their people.”

The Norwegian Refugee Council, which spends about $20 million annually to support primary education in Afghanistan, was still waiting for official word from the Taliban about canceling the classes for girls above the sixth grade. The NRC also provides emergency shelter, food and legal services.

Berenice Van Dan Driessche, advocacy manager for the council, said their representatives had not gotten official word of the change as of Wednesday night, and that girls in the 11 provinces where they work had gone to school but were sent home.

The committee’s staff in the provinces “reported a lot of disappointment and also a lot of uncertainty” about the future, she said. They said that in some areas, teachers said they would continue to hold classes for the girls until the Taliban issued an official order.

Waheedullah Hashmi, external relations and donor representative with the Taliban-led administration, told The Associated Press the decision was made late Tuesday night.

“We don’t say they will be closed forever,” Hashmi added.

U.N. special representative Deborah Lyons will try to meet Thursday with the Taliban to ask them to reverse their decision, U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said.

Earlier in the week, a statement by the Education Ministry had urged “all students” to return when classes resumed Wednesday.

On Tuesday, ministry spokesman Mawlvi Aziz Ahmad Rayan had told AP that all girls would be allowed back to school, although the Taliban administration would not insist on it in those areas where parents were opposed or where schools could not be segregated.

He was reluctant to give details but promised if schools can meet these conditions, “there would no issue for them” to begin classes for girls in the higher grades.

“In principle, there is no issue from the ministry side, but as I said, it is a sensitive and cultural issue,” he added.

The decision to postpone the return of girls at the higher grade levels appeared to be a concession to the rural and deeply tribal backbone of the hard-line Taliban movement that in many parts of the countryside are reluctant to send their daughters to school.

The decision also came as the movement’s leadership has been summoned to southern Kandahar by the reclusive Taliban leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, amid reports of a Cabinet shakeup, according to an Afghan leader who is also a member of the leadership council. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

The official said it was possible that some senior interim Cabinet positions could be changed.

Since the Taliban swept to power in August 2021, there have been persistent reports of differences among the senior leadership. According to these reports, more hard-line members are at odds with pragmatists, who want to see a greater engagement with the world. While staying true to their Islamic beliefs, they want to be less harsh than when they last ruled Afghanistan, banning women from work and girls from schools, the reports say.

Television is permitted in Afghanistan today, unlike in the past, and women are not required to wear the all-encompassing burqa. but must wear the traditional hijab, covering their heads. Women have also returned to work in the Health and Education ministries and at Kabul International Airport at passport control and customs.

The Taliban were ousted in 2001 by a U.S.-led coalition for harboring al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and returned to power after America’s chaotic departure last year.

Girls have been banned from school beyond the sixth grade in most of the country since the Taliban’s return. Universities opened earlier this year in much of the country, but since taking power the Taliban edicts have been erratic. While a handful of provinces continued to provide education to all, most provinces closed educational institutions for girls and women.

In the capital of Kabul private schools and universities have operated uninterrupted.

The religiously driven Taliban administration fears going forward with enrolling girls beyond the sixth grade could alienate their rural base, Hashmi said.

“The leadership hasn’t decided when or how they will allow girls to return to school,” he said. While he accepted that urban centers are mostly supportive of education for girls, much of rural Afghanistan is opposed, particularly in Pashtun tribal regions.

In some rural areas, a brother will disown a city-dwelling brother who allows a daughter to go to school, said Hashmi, adding that the Taliban leadership is trying to decide how to open education for girls beyond the sixth grade nationwide.

Most Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns. In their sweep through the country last year, other ethnic groups such as Uzbeks and Tajiks in northern Afghanistan either joined the fight with them or simply did not oppose them.

“We did everything the Taliban asked in terms of Islamic dress, and they promised that girls could go to school and now they have broken their promise,” said Mariam Naheebi, a journalist who spoke to the AP in Kabul.

“They have not been honest with us,” added Naheebi, who has protested for women’s rights.

http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/2 ... 658230.htm

Joint Statement of the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Among the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan
2022/03/31 19:13
The third Foreign Ministers’Meeting among the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan was held in Tunxi, Anhui Province in China on 31 March 2022. Foreign Ministers or senior representatives of seven countries, namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, attended the meeting.

President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China sent a congratulatory message to the meeting. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres delivered remarks via video link.

In a candid and pragmatic atmosphere of mutual understanding, the parties had comprehensive, in-depth and constructive discussions on the situation in Afghanistan and on cooperation regarding Afghanistan, and declared the following:

I. Political and diplomatic fields

Reaffirmed respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, support for the Afghan people in independently deciding the future of their country, and support for the basic principle of “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”.

Urged the countries mainly responsible for the current predicament in Afghanistan to earnestly fulfill commitments on the economic recovery and future development of Afghanistan.

Stressed that a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan serves the common interests of regional countries and Afghanistan, and expressed readiness to jointly play a constructive role to this end.

Noted the importance to achieve national reconciliation in Afghanistan through dialogue and negotiation, and to establish a broad-based and inclusive political structure, adopt moderate and sound domestic and foreign policies, and grow friendly relations with all countries, especially its neighbors, and emphasized the necessity for all sides to strengthen dialogue and communication with Afghanistan for the above purposes.

Noted the importance of taking necessary continuing steps in Afghanistan on ensuring women’s rights and children’s education, among others, and called for further actions to be taken to improve people’s livelihood, safeguard the fundamental rights of all Afghans, including ethnic groups, women and children.

Reaffirmed opposition to attempts at politicizing humanitarian assistance, and reiterated respect and support for the central role of Afghanistan in distributing and using humanitarian assistance to be rendered by international community and international organizations to the people of Afghanistan.

II. Economic and humanitarian fields

Expressed deep concern over the humanitarian situation, economic and livelihood plight in Afghanistan and announced readiness to provide further humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

Expressed appreciation of and support for the key role of the UN in providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and called on the international community in particular the UN agencies and relevant members of the UN Security Council to step up emergency humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

Followed with concern the spread of COVID-19 and shortages of medicine and medical equipment in Afghanistan, and expressed readiness to help Afghanistan enhance capacity in health care and COVID-19 containment.

Expressed support for Afghanistan’s efforts toward self-generated development, and undertook to support the economic recovery of Afghanistan at both bilateral and multilateral levels, open up ports further, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Afghanistan in such fields as trade and economy, energy, agriculture, finance, connectivity and infrastructure, to help Afghanistan build capacity for self-generated development.

Reaffirmed commitment to deepen cooperation within such frameworks as the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as regional cooperation organizations, and to include Afghanistan in the regional connectivity, energy and transport networks, economic and trade systems, in order to help Afghanistan unleash its geographical advantages and economic potential.

III. Counter-terrorism and security

Noted commitments and pledges made by Afghanistan to the international community that the territory of Afghanistan will not pose any threats to the neighboring countries and no place will be given to terrorist groups on the Afghan territory. 

Stressed terrorism as a key factor affecting stability in Afghanistan, condemned all forms of violence and terrorist attacks, and reiterated that ISIS, Al-Qaeda, ETIM, TTP, BLA, Jondollah, Jaish-Al-Adl, Jamaat Ansarullah, IMU and other terrorist organizations must not be given any place on the Afghan territory.

Called on relevant Afghan parties to take more visible steps to make a clean break with all forms of terrorist forces, monitor free movement of all terrorist organizations, and to firmly fight and eliminate them including through dismantling of their training camps, to ensure that Afghanistan would never again serve as a breeding ground, safe haven or source of proliferation for terrorism.   

Urged relevant Afghan parties to safeguard the security and legitimate rights and interests of foreign citizens and institutions in Afghanistan.

Reaffirmed readiness to strengthen counter-terrorism and security cooperation among neighboring countries, build a united front against terrorism. Noted the initiative of the Republic of Tajikistan on “security belt”around Afghanistan. Tighten border control, prevent terrorist forces from fleeing across borders, and stay committed to safeguarding security and stability in the region. Expressed readiness to conduct counter-terrorism and security cooperation with Afghanistan to help it build counter-terrorism capacity.

Encouraged relevant Afghan parties to take concrete actions against cultivation, production and illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs in order to crack down on organized crime to free Afghanistan from the scourge of drugs.

Reaffirmed readiness to scale up joint efforts to combat cross-border drug-related crime and protect people’s health and social stability.

IV. Refugees

Expressed concern over the situation of the Afghan refugee as well as internally displaced people and support for UN agencies in playing an active role in this regard.

Expressed appreciation of the efforts made by the regional countries, in particular Pakistan and Iran, on the issue of Afghan refugees and called on the international community to provide those countries with continuous, sufficient and proportionate financial support for timely return of Afghan refugees with dignity and honor.

V. Institution building

Announced the launch of a mechanism for regular consultations among special envoys (special representatives) for Afghanistan of the neighboring countries and three working groups namely political and diplomatic, economic and humanitarian, security and stability, to follow up on the outcomes of the foreign ministers’ meetings among the neighboring countries of Afghanistan.

Expressed appreciation and gratitude to the Chinese side for hosting the 3rd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting at the high organizational level, supported Uzbekistan to convene the 4th Foreign Ministers’Meeting in first quarter of 2023 in Tashkent.

https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-host ... 59511.html

February 25, 2022 2:57 PM
Ayaz Gul

China to Host Afghanistan's Neighbors to Review Post-Taliban Situation

ISLAMABAD —
Pakistan said Friday foreign ministers of six immediate neighbors of Afghanistan will gather in China next month to discuss economic and humanitarian upheavals facing the Taliban-ruled, conflict-torn country.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi told a news conference in Islamabad that his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, will also attend the Beijing-hosted two-day meeting starting March 30.

Qureshi said the discussions would focus on ways to protect the Afghan people from the humanitarian crisis and prevent an economic meltdown in Afghanistan.

"If there is, God forbid, an economic meltdown (in Afghanistan), its repercussions will hit not only Pakistan but other neighboring countries and the region at large," Qureshi cautioned.

The gathering in China will be the third such dialogue among Afghanistan's neighbors, including China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, since the Taliban takeover of the country in August.

Islamabad initiated and hosted the inaugural session of the process in September after the Taliban militarily seized power from the now-defunct Western-backed Afghan government and U.S.-led international forces withdrew from the country.

Tehran hosted the second foreign ministers' meeting in late October.

Trilateral on sideline

A senior Pakistani Foreign Ministry official told VOA that Taliban leaders will be invited to the two-day discussions in China to allow them to directly share their assessment of the latest Afghan situation.

The official, who requested anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to media, said a trilateral dialogue involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and China will also be held on the sidelines of the meeting.

He said Chinese and Pakistani officials are expected to discuss and propose economic connectivity projects to Taliban delegates under an ongoing mega-infrastructure development program China is funding in Pakistan. The official did not share further details.

The program, known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is hailed as a flagship of Beijing's global Belt and Road Initiative. It has built roads, power plants and other infrastructure projects in Pakistan with Chinese investments over the past seven years.

"The two sides are ready to discuss with Afghanistan the extension of CPEC to Afghanistan," read a joint statement issued at the end of wide-ranging bilateral talks President Xi Jinping hosted with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in Beijing earlier this month.

Taliban legitimacy

When the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan six months ago, wide-ranging international sanctions dating back to the Islamist group's first time in power from 1996 to 2001 followed.

Washington and other Western nations also suspended financial aid to Kabul and immediately froze billions of dollars in the Afghan central bank's assets, mostly held in the U.S.

The restrictions have pushed the country's heavily aid-dependent economy to the brink of collapse, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, where the United Nations estimates around 23 million people, or 55 percent of the population, face acute hunger.

Foreign countries, including immediate neighbors, have not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan.

The global community wants the hardline group to govern Afghanistan through a broad-based ruling system that represents all Afghan ethnicities, respects human rights, including women's rights to education and work, and disallows terrorists from using the country for cross-border attacks.

Taliban leaders dismiss criticism of their government, saying it is representative of all Afghans, and women are being given access to education as well as work in accordance with Islamic Sharia law. They also claim no terrorist groups are being allowed to use the country for international attacks, assertions disputed by foreign officials and independent critics.

The Taliban under the previous government had banned females from education and work and harbored the al-Qaida terrorist network blamed for orchestrating the September 2001 attacks on the United States.

https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/taliban ... o-trouble/

Taliban-Pakistan Ties Run Into Trouble
Taliban’s recent confrontation of Pakistan over its fencing of the disputed Durand Line, which Afghanistan does not recognize, has taken many by surprise.

Umair Jamal
By Umair Jamal
January 11, 2022

Tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have surged over the past fortnight over Pakistan’s fencing of the Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometer disputed border between the two countries.

Taliban commanders reportedly disrupted fencing of the border in two separate incidents in the last week of December. Videos circulating on social media show Taliban fighters removing fencing at several locations, and warning Pakistani soldiers of action if they continued to pursue the fence building activity.

The incident happened on the very day when representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Islamabad to discuss Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis.

Despite protests from Afghanistan that the fence would divide families living in the Pashtun tribal belt, Pakistan has fenced most of its border with Afghanistan. Underlying Afghan opposition to Pakistani fence is the fact that Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line as the international border.

This has been the position of all Afghan governments. It is therefore not surprising that the Taliban interim government has also refused to accord it recognition. What is surprising, however, is that it has gone a step further than previous Afghan governments and openly confronted Pakistan’s fencing plan at a time when the Taliban government is heavily dependent on Islamabad for political and diplomatic support.

Following the incident, Afghan defense ministry spokesman Enayatullah Khwarazmi said Taliban fighters stopped the Pakistani military from building what he described as an “illegal” border fence. In another development on January 4, Taliban foreign ministry spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi tweeted that some incidents along the Durand Line had “given rise to the need for authorities of the two sides to address the problem.”

The next day, Maulvi Sanaullah Sangin, commander of the Taliban’s border forces for the eastern zone, said: “We will not allow the fencing anytime, in any form [along the Durand Line]. Whatever they [Pakistan] did before, they did, but we will not allow it anymore.” On January 7, reports emerged that the Afghan Taliban had captured seven Pakistani security personnel in Gomal district of Paktika province on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for alleged illegal crossing.

For many in Pakistan, these statements and actions indicate that anti-Pakistan factions within the Taliban’s ranks have not been sidelined and rather appear to be gaining influence over issues that are of significant importance to the Taliban’s supporters and fighters. Pakistan’s fencing project has created resentment among Afghan living along the border regions, as they are opposed to regulations imposed by Pakistan on their cross-border movement.

These groups also include the sympathizers and supporters of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.

It is important to note here that Islamabad has failed to get the Taliban vital diplomatic recognition internationally and the financial assistance that the group desperately needs.

The pro-Pakistan factions within the Taliban ranks have so far only been able to facilitate a dialogue between the TTP and Islamabad, which also fell apart last month. Moreover, the Taliban have not only refused to publicly accept that TTP’s sanctuaries exist in Afghanistan, but also they have actively countered Pakistan’s military attacks, potentially targeting TTP’s hideouts across the Durand Line.

“Some days ago they [Pakistani military] fired some mortars. In response, we fired 32 mortar rounds,” Taliban’s commander of the border forces for the eastern zone, told TOLOnews on January 5.

The Taliban’s unexpected hard line on the border fencing may be partially motivated by the Pakistan government’s tough stance against the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. If that is the case, then TTP-Taliban ties are far closer than previously understood.

The January 6 statement of Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, deputy minister of foreign affairs, merits attention in this context. “The Durand Line is an issue of the whole nation, not the government. It doesn’t belong to the government. We will give the responsibility to the nation, so the nation will make the decision,” he said.

His mention of the “whole nation” was a reference to Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line. In essence, it invalidates the legality of the boundary from Afghanistan’s perspective. Moreover, it supports the TTP’s goal to take “control of Pakistan’s border tribal region and make them independent.”

One can question the timing of the incident as the Taliban’s troubles in governance have only begun and the last thing they want is to ruin their relationship with Pakistan. However, if these incidents are emerging at a time when the Taliban are heavily dependent on Pakistan, imagine what would happen once they gain recognition from countries like India, the United States, and the European Union.

The Taliban are quietly pushing on their own to mend ties with countries like India and the U.S. Last week, the Taliban chief spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid applauded India’s humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. “The Islamic Emirate is grateful to India for its humanitarian assistance and cooperation,” he tweeted.

However, he didn’t publish a single tweet in support of Pakistan’s humanitarian assistance dispatched to Afghanistan last month. Taliban fighters had, in fact, removed Pakistan’s flags from trucks that were carrying humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. These statements and incidents may appear surprising, as many in Pakistan tend to believe that the Taliban are Pakistan’s friends and may respect Islamabad’s wishes on issues of strategic importance to the country.

But this is not the case. While Islamabad may have cultivated a relationship with some leaders of the group, the group’s rank and file do not seem to be appreciative of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan or celebrating ties with the country.

At this stage, it is unclear if Pakistan will choose to deteriorate its ties with the Taliban after supporting the group’s return to power. Its military leadership is aware of the Taliban’s hostile perception of Pakistan. This is one of the reasons for the military actively pursuing the fencing of the border.

Last year, Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa acknowledged in an off-the-record briefing that the Taliban and the TTP are “two faces of the same coin.”

The Afghan Taliban and the TTP share close ethnic ties and have fought together in the past. Available data suggests that the TTP has gained immensely with the Taliban’s return to power.

It is possible that once the Taliban’s financial difficulties ease, we could see the group actively supporting the TTP in Pakistan’s tribal districts to settle the Durand Line issue and develop some leverage against Pakistan on many other issues.

It does seem that Pakistan’s security woes relating to the border dispute and terrorism will worsen during the Taliban’s rule.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/ ... pute-heats

Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up
Taliban’s repudiation of Pakistan’s position on the Durand Line challenges a pillar of Pakistan’s security policy.

Wednesday, January 12, 2022/ BY: Asfandyar Mir, Ph.D.; Ambassador Richard Olson; Andrew Watkins

In at least two incidents in late December and early January, Afghan Taliban soldiers intervened to block an ongoing Pakistani project to erect fencing along the shared border between Afghanistan and Pakistan — the demarcation of which prior Afghan governments have never accepted. Despite attempts to resolve the issue diplomatically, and the Taliban’s dependence on Pakistan as a bridge to the international community, both sides remain at odds over the fence. USIP’s Richard Olson, Asfandyar Mir and Andrew Watkins assess the implications of this border dispute for Afghanistan and Pakistan’s bilateral relationship and the region at large.

Does the Taliban have an established position on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or is this a new stance on their part? How much of a sticking point might this issue prove to be in future bilateral relations?
Olson: It was perhaps inevitable that despite the Taliban’s historic reliance on Pakistan for support, there would be a break with Islamabad over the question of the Durand Line border between the two countries. The Taliban asserts a right to free movement of peoples across the colonial era frontier, consistent with the position of not recognizing the line as an international boundary it took in the 1990s. All Afghan governments since 1947 have taken similar positions on this dispute. The issue may be further complicated by the fact that — apart from the issue of recognition — Pakistan demarcates the Durand Line differently from Afghanistan, and thus portions of the Pakistani fence may lie within what Afghanistan (and most of the international community, including the United States) would consider Afghan territory.

Pakistan has downplayed the clashes on the line, publicly calling for a diplomatic resolution to the issue, thus also recalling its own position of the 1990s. But for Islamabad, the question of unrest in its own Pashtun territories looms much larger now than it did three decades ago, since the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas have been a source of terrorism and instability throughout this century. Kabul’s allowing of a de facto safe haven for the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan; TTP) is already a large irritant in the bilateral relationship. If Islamabad perceives that the Afghan Taliban has moved beyond asserting a traditional position on the Durand Line to actually supporting a revanchist movement to reclaim lost Pashtun lands, the relationship may well break. Already Islamabad is ascribing the TTP’s renewed strength to Indian machinations, so the regional implications of this conflict are potentially large.

How much of an impact has Pakistan’s border fencing project had on its internal security? How does the Pakistani military now view the situation on its western border following the Taliban takeover, and how does this fence fit into its security priorities?
Mir: Pakistan’s fencing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been a central project of Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Qamar Bajwa’s security policy for the country’s western frontier. Given Pakistan’s fiscal constraints, it has been very costly for Pakistan in material terms. There are reports that Pakistan has spent nearly $532 million on the project. Pakistan appears to have had two major political goals with the fencing effort: to control cross-border movement of goods and people across what has long been a porous border, as well as to offer a demarcation fait accompli on a border which has been rejected by prior Afghan governments. While the movement of illicit goods hasn’t slowed down, the movement of civilians and migrants appears to have become largely restricted to declared border crossings.

The demarcation fait accompli objective is important. When done bilaterally, demarcation of borders involving one or more post-colonial states tends to be generally contentious and drawn out. And diplomatic negotiations over borders involving territorial claims and disputes tend to be especially difficult and take a very long time. But Pakistan was able to work around that by unilaterally pursuing the demarcation and marking it on the ground with a fence mostly unchallenged — a major diplomatic gain.

Amid this backdrop, the Taliban’s repudiation of Pakistan’s position on the border and actual physical effort to dismantle the fence at multiple points is more than an invocation of a historical claim. It is a tangible challenge to a pillar of Pakistan’s recent security policy — more serious than the rhetorical challenges of the former Afghan government under presidents Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai. It also casts doubt on a long-standing Pakistani strategic thesis that the Taliban’s Islamist and relatively pro-Pakistan political project — which served as a basis for Pakistan’s support to the Taliban during the U.S. presence in Afghanistan — will keep a lid on their irredentist nationalist aspirations.

Pakistani policy makers appear to be realizing that the Taliban will walk the talk of jihad and chew the gum of border nationalism at the same time. Will this compel a rethink in Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban? Not immediately. But if the Taliban ramp up their challenge against the border, Pakistan might seek to influence the Taliban’s internal politics more aggressively.

How has the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and establishment of itself as a de facto government, rather than insurgent challenger, changed its overall stance toward borders or its relations with neighbors?
Watkins:The actions of Taliban forces along the border with Pakistan should be assessed in tandem with other recent Taliban skirmishes along the borders with Turkmenistan and Iran (and a handful of tense situations with Tajikistan as well). Though both Taliban and neighboring country officials have downplayed these incidents and they are not similarly rooted in a border controversy as live or hot as that of the Durand Line, the Taliban seems to have experienced a rough learning curve when it comes to border security.

It is possible, in the case of tensions with Pakistan, that the Taliban’s leadership perceives some political benefit to a strong nationalist stance — even more so than with other neighboring countries, given widespread Afghan perceptions of the Taliban’s close relationship with Islamabad, or put more bluntly, accusations that they serve as Pakistan’s proxy.

But close monitoring of Taliban forces’ behavior along the border with Pakistan also suggests some degree of command-and-control difficulty. More than once since their takeover of the country last August, individual Taliban stationed at major border crossings have carried out ostensibly isolated acts, including cross-border exchanges of fire but also petty vandalism and harassment, that have been swiftly disavowed by official spokesmen. Most of these incidents suggest a hostility toward Pakistan among the group’s rank and file, one that higher levels of Taliban command appear able to respond to, but not preempt entirely. These dynamics are not the drivers of geopolitical tensions between Islamabad and Kabul’s new government, but they may serve to trigger episodes of conflict.

What other impacts has the fencing effort had on trade, transit or social connections between the two countries? How has the economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan impacted out-migration to Pakistan or created other cross-border pressures, and how are the Taliban and Pakistan seeking to manage this?
Watkins: Scholars and specialists who monitor human and narcotics trafficking out of Afghanistan have reported that smuggling has continued at a rapid pace, even outpacing previous years since August. As Pakistan has continued to finalize its fencing of the border, this illicit flow of people and goods has become geographically centralized in Afghanistan’s southwestern region, where Nimroz Province borders both Pakistan and Iran.

In terms of human displacement, this has amounted to hundreds of thousands of Afghans crossing the border into Pakistan in the latter half of 2021, making an indirect trip to Iran and often then onward to Turkey and intended European destinations — with hundreds of thousands more anticipated to cross in 2022. In a sharp break from historical precedent, which saw Pakistan host millions of Afghan refugees over the last four decades, relatively few of those Afghans fleeing have attempted to settle in Pakistan. Aside from the few remaining openings in Pakistan’s border fence, Islamabad has maintained strict limitations on civilian traffic back and forth across the border since August, intended to forestall any mass human displacement into the towns and cities of its border region.

Though observers have predicted that tensions would sharpen between the Taliban and Pakistan over the Durand Line, for all the reasons elucidated here, the two actors did manage to stabilize the flow of commercial and humanitarian border traffic in relatively swift and efficient fashion after the Taliban’s sudden August takeover. While major disruptions to supply chains remain, by September the two largest border crossings had reestablished at least some two-way commercial traffic — and the Taliban have since touted selective statistics suggesting that some exports have even increased to Pakistan since their takeover.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-int ... fghanistan

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan
September 7, 2021

Jon Alterman: Colin Clark is a senior research fellow and the director of policy and research at The Soufan Center. He taught at Carnegie Mellon and worked at the Rand corporation for 10 years. Colin, welcome to Babel.

Colin Clarke: Thank you for having me.

Jon Alterman: You've looked at Afghanistan, and you've looked at Iran for a long time. What's at stake for Iran in Afghanistan right now?

Colin Clarke: Other countries and other regional powers are going to fill that void. Chief atop that list is Iran looking to extend influence into Afghanistan. The Iranian regime has worked with the Taliban in the past— despite the ideological differences—and the bond between Iran and the Taliban can be strengthened by their common enemy, the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). Iran suffered a number of Islamic State attacks itself. There's great concern that given the Islamic State’s sectarian agenda, more could be on the way—particularly if that group grows and spreads throughout Afghanistan as some expect.

Jon Alterman: You've said that there's an Iranian relationship with al Qaeda. There is certainly an Iranian relationship with the Taliban. There’s an Iranian relationship with the Islamic State Khorasan. Can you describe those relationships? As you suggest, it's not intuitive that Iran would have relationships with any group of Sunni extremists.

Colin Clarke: You're right. That's one of the areas where we've been forced to think outside of the box as analysts. For too long, there was kneejerk group think that Sunnis and Shi`ites could never work together under any circumstances, and a lot of this thinking was predominant the height of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was waging a sectarian conflict in the region, layered on top of the ongoing cold war between the Saudis and the Iranians. The question was countries in the region kind of fall into place behind those respective regional powers. The Iran-al Qaeda relationship is extremely complicated. I wrote a really lengthy peace in Lawfare, with Asfandyar Mir, where we tease some of that out. In a nutshell, Asfandyar and I described the relationship as

begrudging in some ways, with Iran hosting al Qaeda leaders but also keeping a very close eye on those leaders—perhaps not close enough as we learned with the assassination of Abu Muhammed al-Masri, allegedly by the Israelis. Saif al-Adel is believed to be in Iran as well, waiting in the wings, depending on what happens with al-Qaeda’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Iran’s relationship with al-Qaeda is a marriage of convenience.

Jon Alterman: You’ve described it as a sophisticated hedging strategy.

Colin Clarke: I do think it is a sophisticated hedging strategy. It gives them a little bit of leverage. It gives them some chips to play—especially with Afghanistan in flux, the Taliban taking back over in the region, and al Qaeda once again having the umbrella of Taliban protection. It is not assumed—at least by me—that al Qaeda is immediately going to set its sights on the West. The Taliban has an interest in making sure that al Qaeda doesn't begin attacking the West again because, if so, it's going to be a complicated task for the Taliban to maintain control of Afghanistan, which will already be a struggle. In terms of Iran and the Taliban, the history is well documented, with some of the enmity and the animosity there going back to Iranian diplomats being slaughtered in Afghanistan. Iran has provided material support and assistance to the Taliban at various stages of this conflict, so there is a relationship there. The Iranians can be quite pragmatic. So can the Taliban, but I still see this as a draconian organization ruling the country. People have pointed out, “well it’s not ISIS.” I said, “if you’re moderate compared to ISIS, you’re still pretty extreme.

Jon Alterman: On the Islamic State Khorasan—which most people haven't heard of until last month—how much of a threat do you think it is for the Iranians? How much of a threat is it to Iranian interest? What tools do the Iranians have to limit the group’s influence?

Colin Clarke: I want to be measured in the level of threat that I think ISK can pose. Even within Afghanistan, there's no risk that ISK is going to usurp the Taliban or pose any real threat to its leadership, but I do think it can play a spoiler role. Given its presence in Nagarhar and Kunar provinces, its success in recruiting among Salafis in those provinces, and its access to the witches’ brew of Jihadi groups along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, I do think that it has some potential staying power. We've seen its capabilities, its reach into Kabul itself, and the spectacular attacks that this group has launched. I think the chief threat to Iran is that this group has pursued such a sectarian agenda—mainly attacking Shi`ite Hazara in Afghanistan. That’s the way that Islamic State franchises across the board look to generate momentum and recruits. They want to go after Shi`a, almost above anyone else, and so Iran poses an attractive target to the Islamic State—not only Iranian soil, but Iranian interests in Afghanistan. This is particularly relevant as Iran ramps up its presence—as I expect—and we see a bigger footprint that provides more targets for the Islamic State.

That same thing is true of other countries as well. There is a lot of talk about Chinese influence in Afghanistan and people assume that it is going to be clear sailing for China, but I think a more significant Chinese presence in the region is going to come with some strings attached. The

U.S. security umbrella is not there. China's not going to have unfettered access to minerals like people have been describing. There are going to be some security implications that come with a larger footprint—even if it’s mostly an economic footprint.

Jon Alterman: Afghanistan had emerged as a large trading partner for Iran, partly because foreign aid to Afghanistan represented more than 40 percent of the Afghan GDP, and the Iranians were selling fuel. They were selling all kinds of things across the border. What happens to the economic ties between Iran and Afghanistan, when Afghanistan gets much more isolated from the global economy?

Colin Clarke: That's at the forefront of the thinking of a lot of folks that I've spoken to recently. They bring up the economy and some of those ties and if there are struggles, do we see an increase in illicit economic activity, including cross border smuggling—smuggling of humans, drugs, and illicit goods back and forth across the border. I do think the refugee issue is going to be a big deal as Afghans figure out whether or not they want to stay under Taliban rule. If they don’t want to stay, are there human smuggling networks along the border that are reactivated? How does that pad the pockets of some economic power brokers that operate over in western Afghanistan? Moreover, do we see any kind of involvement by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or others tasked with monitoring that border? We know there have been allegations of corruption before. How does the IRGC deal with that? If you start seeing security incidents along that border, it's even more of an impetus to shut down some of the trade and the back and forth. I think it’s a significant concern.

Jon Alterman: As one of the consequences of the previous flood of Afghans into Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, Iran created these Afghan brigades, the Liwa Fatemiyoun, who have gone off and fought in other parts of the Middle East, on behalf of Iranians under Iranian leadership. Do you think there's a likelihood that Iran is going to try to inject some of these Afghan origin fighters under Iranian command back into Afghanistan as there's a battle for control state?

Colin Clarke: It seems totally plausible depending on what the security situation looks like. There have been some Iranian government officials—it might have even been Zarif—that have openly mused about what they were going to do with the Liwe Fatemiyoun brigades. Back in 2017, I wrote an article in the CTC Sentinel with Phillip Smith, where we talked about this. There is this Iranian foreign fighter network, and once Syria winds down, these guys are not going to go home and become bakers and mechanics and schoolteachers. This is now a new tool for Iran to use in the region—much in the way that it's wielded the cudgel of Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and the Houthis. This is just another option for Iran to conduct its foreign and security policy, or—in the case where it feels really threatened by what's happening in Afghanistan— to have some kind of a kinetic solution that still keeps Iran itself at arm's length working through proxies. This is a trend that I think is increasing. We're seeing this with what Turkey is doing in Libya. There is a lot more of this trend that seems to be a just a normal part of almost any conflict across the region now.

Jon Alterman: You've talked about the ways the Iranians have developed a whole series of interests in Afghanistan—a whole series of people they can influence in Afghanistan. Over the last several decades, the other place they've done that has been in Iraq. How would you compare and contrast the way the Iranians have sought to build clients and instruments of influence in Afghanistan, versus what we've seen them doing in Iraq?

Colin Clarke: To me, Iraq is more organic. There's more of an Iraqi presence and a history and a lineage of some of these Iran-backed Shi’ite groups in Iraq. The Afghan model is a little bit different, and it's interesting to me in many ways because the Afghans that are under Iranian tutelage at the moment are largely trained and cutting their teeth and gaining battle experience in Syria. If you think about the way the United States has attempted to train some counterterrorism forces, it’s said, “let’s take them out of Syria, bring them to Jordan, train them up, and send them back.” It is like players from the home team playing an away game—to use a baseball analogy—because they've been in a different theater against different adversaries, operating alongside Russian air power. There are so many more different dynamics in Syria. When you look at the Iraqi case for comparison, the capabilities are also a lot higher with some of these groups like KH.

Jon Alterman: That’s Kataib Hezbollah.

Colin Clarke: Yes. Sorry for slipping into acronyms speak. Those groups are a lot more developed than what we would see in Afghanistan, but again, Iran is patient. They've done this successfully with Lebanese Hezbollah and with other groups. I think we've seen what a force multiplier tacit knowledge transfer can be. IRGC Quds Force hands-on trainers and the provision of sophisticated technology and weaponry can get you a lot in the Middle East. We talk a lot about state actors, and this is one of these interesting areas of convergence between great power competition and counterterrorism. The Iranians are at the center of that. This is a state that has long been a state sponsor of terrorism, and it's now—as part of its foreign policy—looking to grow many Hezbollah-like groups across the region. Why have they done it? Frankly, because it's been effective.

Jon Alterman: You've written a lot about how much the Iranians benefited from the U.S. security presence in Afghanistan. It helped cut down on drug smuggling. It helped cut down on some of these very anti-Shi`a groups that circulate in Afghanistan. What do you see as the possibility of the United States and Iran aligning along common goals and Afghanistan, as indeed they did shortly after the fall of the Taliban?

Colin Clarke: Making predictions about the Middle East is fraught. right, what did Yogi Berra say, “I don't like to make predictions, especially about the future”? I tag, “and especially about the Middle East,” on top of that. It is one of those situations where geopolitics makes for strange bedfellows, and you're right, they did coordinate early on in this conflict. By some accounts they coordinated quite effectively, so that's something we could see again. I often wonder without a U.S. security umbrella there, does it make the United States more likely to cooperate because the U.S. sees itself as having little leverage? The fact the matter is that the United States is going to have to rely to some degree on powers in the region that fill this vacuum for intelligence because al Qaeda and the Islamic State are not just U.S. problems. That is especially true when you throw in Uyghurs, Chechens, and Uzbeks—and all these other groups into the mix. Moscow is concerned about blowback. Beijing is concerned about blowback. Tehran is concerned about blowback. India and Pakistan see everything through their own zero-sum lens. There is going to have to be greater communication between the United States and countries that we would consider adversaries. Is that something that can be viewed in isolation? We're at loggerheads in many other areas. Is this an area where we can expect some kind of partnership? Again, I've been skeptical in the past—particularly on the U.S.-Russian front, of anything of value we would get from the Russians—but there have been instances of cooperation. It's just not something I would base my entire strategy around.

Jon Alterman: Let me ask the flip side of that question. What do you think is the danger of the U.S. and Iran falling into grey-zone competition in Afghanistan—that there are some issues where Iran seeks to advance its own interest by using Afghanistan as a platform in a way that threatens American interests?

Colin Clarke: It threatens to derail other areas where we do need to make progress and where the stakes are higher. I've spent the last 20 years studying terrorism and counterterrorism and I don't find terrorism to be an existential threat to the United States. I think that in many ways we've overreacted to the threat of terrorism. That said, it is something to take seriously. I think that grey-zone competition between the United States and Iran in Afghanistan could lead to escalation, and if that escalation derails more important objectives—like reaching an accord on the nuclear issue—that's really problematic. We've been able to look at these issues in isolation so far, but does that continue? I think a lot depends on what form that grey-zone competition takes and if the United States considers it beyond the pale of what other nations would normally do.

Jon Alterman: Is there something that you think the United States should do to try to ensure that the United States and Iran can use Afghanistan as a platform for greater understanding and cooperation, rather than a platform for veiled competition?

Colin Clarke: The United States could very well take initiative. We've been there for 20 years. Even though we're now leaving, we've got a decent understanding of the players and their objectives. It could be an olive branch to the Iranians to say, “look, we're leaving, and we can help you understand the lay of the land, particularly what we think is going to change in our own absence,” because surely, we've done an analysis of how things on the ground will change without a U.S. presence there. Some of those changes may be negative for Iran, so helping to assuage Iranian concerns could create a crack in the door that opens the possibility for further conversations. I've seen other people that are really pessimistic about anything that the United States could offer the Iranians—or that the Iranians would be willing to reciprocate with because of the recent change in leadership. I think there's an opportunity. How likely is it to be fruitful? It is hard to say.

Jon Alterman: That is a lot to think about. Colin Clarke, thank you for joining us on Babel.

Colin Clarke: Thanks very much for having me.